Sri Lanka's alternatives abroad

By Kitana Ananda, V V Ganeshananthan & Ashwini Vasanthakumar
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There is no such thing as 'the Sri Lankan diaspora'. Sri Lankan communities exist in the plural. And yet, nearly thirty years of conflict have rendered a nation with multiple minority communities and religions as though it has only two groups. If you generalise about what you read at all (and most people do), you are likely to believe that Sri Lanka's Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority are pitted against each other, not only inside the country but in diasporas all over the world.

While conflict and geographic dispersal present real challenges to Sri Lankan diasporas, this image of Sinhalese versus Tamil is far from the whole truth. Although the war ended with a decisive victory by government security forces over the LTTE in 2009, the reductive image remains: Sri Lanka, a nation with Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim and Burgher communities, rarely appears that way. The media is not the only culprit. In the wake of that resounding military victory, both the Sri Lankan government and its critics have failed to engage Sri Lankan diasporas and to understand their complexity. Indeed, their collective actions have excluded diasporic populations.

Lankan diaspora histories often begin with 1983, when anti-Tamil violence and the rise of Tamil militancy led to the civil war that displaced hundreds of thousands of Tamils from the island. In fact, a longer and more complicated history of migration is responsible for today's Lankan diasporas. During the 1930s and 1940s, English-speaking upper-caste Ceylonese who worked in the British Empire's civil service formed diasporic settlements from Burma to Malaya.

After independence in 1948, new legislation disenfranchised Tamils of Indian origin, who had been brought in to work on colonial plantations during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Many members of that community were subsequently repatriated to India. An attempt to nationalise government administration with the 1956 Official Language Act ' popularly dubbed 'Sinhala Only' ' led to the migration of Ceylonese professionals of all communities who were not proficient in Sinhala. Large numbers of Burghers, the community of mixed Sri Lankan and European descent, migrated to Britain, Canada and Australia; Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim professionals followed, accompanied by their families.

In these transitional decades, there was no such thing as a Tamil or Sinhalese diaspora; but by the late 1970s this was no longer the case, as factionalism escalated within the country. Three decades of state and economic restructuring had not created a united 'Sri Lankan' nation, and tensions mounted between a Sinhalese-dominated government and Tamil political parties. Disaffection with the political status quo gave rise to a 1971 insurrection among predominantly rural Sinhalese youths in the south, and growing militancy among Tamil youths in the north and east by the latter part of the decade. University admissions quotas, among other policies, effectively reduced opportunities for middle-class Tamil students and young professionals, who began to seek employment abroad.

Diasporas today

In July 1983, nearly 3000 people were killed and thousands more displaced over five days of government-sponsored anti-Tamil violence, creating a new wave of migrants. The scale of destruction and spectacular displays of enmity spurred sympathetic Western governments to create special categories for refugee resettlement. As the country descended from ethnic conflict into full-scale war between the government and Tamil militant groups, the tide of migration continued. In the 1980s, as the LTTE rose to supremacy by brutally eliminating other Tamil militant groups, non-LTTE Tamil militants and their families emigrated. Internally, too, the country saw mass displacement of Muslims and Tamils.

The war with the state intensified through the mid-1980s and 1990s, again prompting hundreds of thousands of Tamils to depart. By some estimates, nearly 900,000 ' one in three ' Tamils from Sri Lanka today live abroad, hailing predominantly from the country's north and, to a lesser extent, the east. India was often their first stop and, for some, their final destination. Others headed to Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, each of which offered the possibility of citizenship. Others remain refugees in India, Southeast Asia and Europe. As the war escalated, the pro-LTTE section of the diaspora became famously militant, pouring money into the Tigers' movement, while their relatives and friends back home lost children, homes and livelihoods. The Tigers even developed an overseas wing, which managed its propaganda so successfully that other sections of the Tamil diaspora were virtually erased from the public sphere.

Admittedly, the largest Sri Lankan diaspora is a Tamil one, which has commanded considerable attention as a result of post-1983 migration, the war, and visible propaganda and financial support for the LTTE among some of its sections. Some use Sri Lankan diaspora and Tamil diaspora interchangeably, but Sinhalese and Muslim Sri Lankans have also gone to other shores amid political crises and economic uncertainty, and they continue to emigrate, predominantly as temporary migrant workers to West Asia. Sizeable and diverse Sinhalese diaspora communities have formed ' among workers in Italy, professionals in the United States, and several generations of migrants to the United Kingdom and Canada.

Today, some Sinhalese (and, to a lesser extent, Muslim) groups maintain ties with each other and with Sri Lanka through various associations. For some organisations, 'Sri Lanka' becomes a proxy for displays of Sinhalese nationalism that make critiques of the Sri Lankan government difficult. Similarly, prominent diasporic Tamil organisations have long showcased arguments for separatism, sometimes accompanied by endorsements of the LTTE. Those who do not agree with these respective lines face isolation from their own ethnic communities.

In May 2009, the war's end saw the differing trajectories of these diasporas converge in tense confrontations in Canada, the UK, Australia and elsewhere. Thousands of Tamils around the world protested the war and the suffering it imposed. Those waving LTTE flags monopolised media attention, sidelining the message of 'peace through negotiations' emanating from other quarters. In response, smaller Sri Lankan groups with close connections to embassies and missions abroad organised counter-demonstrations. Their predominantly Sinhalese ranks also included anti-LTTE Tamils who cheered the Tigers' defeat and hailed the soldiers who ended the war through military action.

Just remittances, please

Over the course of the war, the visibility of dominant sections of the Tamil diaspora ' and their stunning vocal and financial support for the Tamil Tigers ' has helped the Sri Lankan government to project the entire group as a terrorist threat. Post-war, the authorities' attempts to derail a monolithic 'Tamil diaspora' have transformed into interest in that diaspora's sizable collective wallet. In anticipation of a post-war Lanka, the government handpicked leaders and activists of the Tamil diaspora to attend a March 2009 conference in Colombo. At the meeting, dubbed the Sri Lankan Diaspora Dialogue, many of the invitees expressed dismay with the government's heavy-handed agenda. Even as the government invited some Tamils to return to the island, it has made the following conflicting claims: The LTTE has been completely decimated; the LTTE could re-emerge at any time, and has powerful supporters abroad; the diaspora is invited to engage with us financially; we are no longer a colony, and those who criticise us from abroad have the mindset of colonisers (or support the LTTE).

The LTTE's claim to be Tamils' 'sole representative' ' and its well-known allies abroad ' is convenient for the government, which wants remittances, not opinions. If it links all its overseas critics to the Tigers, it can dismiss their concerns. As pro-LTTE activists in the diaspora say they will continue to fight for Eelam from abroad (the most visible iteration being the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, formed in May following a diaspora-wide election), their statements fuel Colombo's ire. In retaliation, the government has announced local and international campaigns to gather intelligence, seize assets and shut down the LTTE's remaining international network. In such a climate of suspicion, the government has been quick to conflate any criticism with support for the LTTE, leaving no room for serious diasporic engagement with the state.

On the other hand, the government does recognise diasporas' economic and political power, as well as the effectiveness of pro-LTTE activists overseas who have made it difficult for their critics to speak out. Indeed, since the Diaspora Dialogue, Colombo has learned much from the LTTE's hegemony in diaspora communities. The government sidesteps political criticism by appealing to the desire of many to aid the war-torn regions of north and east Sri Lanka. To initiate development projects in these areas, it turns to ex-members of the Tigers. Former Tiger arms procurer and international-affairs representative Kumaran Pathmanathan now sits under house arrest in Colombo, dispensing advice to the government; his own public rehabilitation was announced with the launch of the North-East Rehabilitation Development Organization, for which he claimed 'the Tamil diaspora' was ready to work with the president. In the Eastern province, former Tigers and current government officials Pillayan and Karuna have their names bandied about as evidence of state engagement with minorities.

The power of foreign exchange as a potent resource for post-war reconstruction is not limited to the Tamil diasporas alone. With the war's end, Sri Lankan embassies have raised funds (more than USD 690,000 to date), mainly from Sinhalese entrepreneurs and organisations, for Api wenuwen api (Be together for all), a Ministry of Defence campaign to build 50,000 houses for soldiers. Opposition groups also mobilise Sinhalese diaspora communities for their own ends. For example, in September, Sinhalese workers in Italy protested the Colombo government's continued detention of the former head of the Sri Lankan armed forces, Sarath Fonseka.

The government's latest statements continue to entreat 'the Sri Lankan diaspora' to participate in economic development. At the Asia Security Summit in August 2010, Minister of External Affairs G L Peiris said, 'Our message to the diaspora in the Western world and elsewhere is that they have a dynamic role to play; we do not want them to distance themselves from the exciting developments which are taking place in Sri Lanka today.' Such pronouncements are made even as the government cracks down on dissent and political opposition within Sri Lanka, and invokes the spectre of threats to national security to silence activists abroad. Peiris, a chief negotiator during the Oslo peace process, has recently argued that earlier talks and attempts at political reform failed due to a lack of consensus among dominant political interests. This top-down approach has allowed generations of Sri Lankan politicians to suppress debate and dissent while claiming to remain committed to political reform, and the same technique is now being used to mobilise the diaspora communities' economic power.

This dual approach to (particularly) Tamil diaspora communities dismisses legitimate grievances and criticisms. Simultaneously, it invites potential investors to capitalise on the war's end and selectively wields former LTTE leaders to collect economic contributions from the former. This not only privileges the economically secure and undermines the political engagement of diaspora communities in general, but also silences the many moderates ' in-country and abroad ' who did not provide unqualified support to the narrow agendas of successive governments or the LTTE. Such groups could not publicly criticise these agendas before, nor are they able to do so now. Instead, they remain sceptical and watchful of the many projects undertaken in their name.

Discounting nationalism

The government's dismissal of the Tamil diaspora as being little more than LTTE henchmen is not surprising. It is less encouraging, however, when the same attitude is revealed in progressives' discussions of, and engagement with, the diaspora. The left has largely disengaged from diasporic politics, preferring to direct its limited energies to the battles to be waged in-country. But this myopia prevents engagement with the considerable resources of moderates within the diaspora.

During the war, progressives from all communities attempted to create space within the diaspora from which exclusivist nationalism could be challenged. Emphasising marginalised histories to refute nationalist narratives, these activists deployed the language of human rights and political pluralism. But they largely engaged with diasporic politics because of its importance to politics in Sri Lanka. Now, in the aftermath of the Tigers' defeat, this effort has atrophied. And by equating the Tigers' totalitarian politics with Tamil nationalism and the government's brutal tactics with Sinhalese nationalism, the left only reaffirms these actors' respective claims to represent Sinhalese and Tamil peoples.

This cedes important ideological and political ground. Furthermore, by depicting nationalism as static, regressive and exclusivist, the left fails to appreciate the varieties of nationalism, its potential as a source of solidarity, and its importance in forging and transforming identities. Indeed, national identity is what ties those in the diaspora ' including progressives who would rather identify themselves as expatriate or exile ' to politics in Sri Lanka. But from the diaspora various nationalisms can also emerge, where the multiple identities and affiliations of those in the diaspora can fruitfully inform and expand nationalist politics in Sri Lanka. Many Tamils were privately critical of the LTTE's tactics; many Sinhalese were critical of the state's growing authoritarianism. Clearly, between the poles there is space for common ground.

Progressives fashion themselves as exiles who, after years in the ideological hinterlands of the diaspora, can return to Sri Lanka and resume agitating for the transformations they failed to secure thirty years ago ' as though those intervening decades did not happen. What this has meant among many leftists in exile is supporting a project of authentic nationalism ' for some ethnic, for others, multi-ethnic ' from abroad, without engaging the communities living in their midst.

Responsible resource

The Colombo government will not successfully engage diaspora communities in large-scale reconstruction if it continues to approach them in the same manner as it did throughout the war. Without a political process aimed at ending minority grievances on the island, many Tamil expatriates will continue to view the government's embrace with scepticism. More fundamentally, diasporas should not be engaged only because they are deemed useful to 'real' Sri Lankan political actors engaged in the serious business of realpolitik. Rather, diasporas should be recognised as legitimate arenas of Sri Lankan politics. To claim otherwise is to reward regimes that neutralise political opposition and silence dissidents by expelling them.

For their part, members of Sri Lanka's diasporas need to begin a process of critical reflection regarding the last thirty years of war, something that was discouraged amidst calls for solidarity. Instead of forgetting the so-called 'tragic decades of nationalism', communities across the political spectrum need to consider their complicity in its crimes, their complacency in the face of its manifest excesses, and their failures in advancing compelling alternatives. Such efforts might be most effective in Sri Lanka, and have begun in various fora there; but, given the significance of the diaspora in Sri Lankan politics and the relatively greater freedoms enjoyed outside Sri Lanka, it is imperative that these conversations happen outside too, and happen publicly.

This political reflection is especially important as the Sri Lankan government woos overseas communities for economic contributions, and contributions alone. Many are understandably excited by Sri Lanka's post-war economic prospects. And in some respects, economic involvement can be more tempting than political engagement: its requirements are more discrete, its rewards more apparent, and it can look refreshingly (if deceptively) apolitical. In reality, of course, economic development in post-conflict Sri Lanka is subject to intense contestation, with economic fortunes inevitably linked to political positioning (see Himal Oct-Nov, 'Capitalism contradictions'). Alternatively, the economic clout of responsible diasporic investors can ensure that the war and its bloody aftermath do not get airbrushed away, as in the glossy picture the government and its uncritical allies are so eager to promote.

The diaspora can also promote reconciliation by mirroring it abroad. In the absence of reliable media coverage from Sri Lanka, youth overseas have been too easily radicalised by incomplete histories and half-truths. This can only be countered by collective action to share stories and political pasts. As those private conversations become public, salient criticisms can gain traction through coalitions of progressive voices. Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim and Burgher activists forming alliances overseas can become a powerful medium for critique and change. Those critical of diasporic extremists have rightfully called for grounding, and for true accountability to those on the ground in Sri Lanka. With action comes responsibility: if we want to work within Sri Lanka, we must listen to those who live there. Sinhalese and Tamil activists abroad must note that certain populations marginalised inside Sri Lanka ' for example, Muslims, Burghers and Up-country Tamils ' are correspondingly underrepresented in the diaspora. Their interests are Sri Lanka's interests, and critique of the country must consider and engage them.

Sri Lankan diasporas are an easy target. They are easily ridiculed, their most vocal members often spouting opinions that seem ignorant. Their memories of grievance and grief are embarrassingly fresh, their suggestions oversimplified and trite, their language loaded. Their physical absence from Sri Lanka seems to preclude their involvement in its political life. Their hyphenated identities and modified accents undermine their authenticity. They are not really Sri Lankan ' that is, at least, when they do not serve the interests of the 'authentic' political actors in Sri Lanka. But they are also an unrivalled resource, with legitimate claims to space in Sri Lankan politics, and filial and financial ties to the country. They genuinely care about Sri Lanka and, in a world with increasingly porous borders, they have every right to do so. Their transnational politics is a product of the war, and they remain connected to Sri Lanka, even though their homes are abroad. Can the country afford ' from a practical or moral standpoint ' to turn its back on a million people who could contribute to its future?

© Himal

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Sri Lanka and Pakistan to strengthen cooperation in counter terrorism

Defence Professionals
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Sri Lanka and Pakistan have agreed to strengthen cooperation in counter terrorism. "Pakistan can learn from Sri Lanka's experience and expertise, and share views and experiences with you," stated Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi addressing the media yesterday (29).

"Defence cooperation as I said has been good. And we are expecting a high level defence delegation to come to Sri Lanka to look into other areas of mutual interest. Pakistan's Naval Chief will be visiting Sri Lanka in December as well," said Minister Qureshi.

The Foreign Minister appreciated the people and the government of Sri Lanka for providing humanitarian assistance to Pakistan during the recent unprecedented floods. "The support provided by the people of Sri Lanka is highly appreciated", he added.

"We have decided to consult with Sri Lanka more than in the past and cooperate with each other more and as well as cooperate with each other at the UN forum. We will support each others candidatures in the past and we will do so further," said Qureshi.

Sri Lanka and Pakistan both need to build their foreign reserves and if we can trade in commodities and if we can buy and sell, then it can be useful for both sides," he added.

Pakistan is the first country that made a State visit to Sri Lanka since President Mahinda Rajapaksa was sworn in for his second term of office, said expressing Pakistan's delight. "This in our view is an expression of excellent bilateral relations that Pakistan has enjoyed with Sri Lanka and also an acknowledgment of Pakistan's contribution in helping Sri Lanka in its fight against terrorism," said Qureshi.

The Foreign Minister also congratulated the people and the Government of Sri Lanka for this successful endeavor.

"Pakistan knows how challenging it is, for we are going through a similar difficult period ourselves. The people of Pakistan are today in agreement that we have to fight terrorism and reverse extremism. The law agencies and Armed Forces in Pakistan have carried out very successful operations," stated Qureshi.

"The Pakistani Government feels that there are great opportunities of enhancing bilateral trade. We have in place the economic architecture. There are some good interesting prospects that we need to look into," Qureshi said.

© defpro.news

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Veteran journalist Sivanayagam passes away

Tamil Net
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Veteran journalist S. Sivanayagam whose contributions were part of the history of the liberation struggle of Eezham Tamils, passed away on Monday in Colombo at the age of 80. The funeral will take place on Thursday. Joining The Daily News in 1953, he became the founder editor of Saturday Review started in Jaffna in 1982. The weekly that made a name in the early stages of the Tamil militant struggle had an abrupt end with the 1983 pogrom.

He was later in charge of the Tamil Information Centre in Chennai. In 1990, he was editing a new journal Tamil Nation. Following the assassination of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, he was arrested without any charges, harassed, insulted and was ill treated by the Indian intelligence. He left India in 1993 to get asylum in France. He was also residing in London. Ailing from bone cancer, a few years ago he went back to Colombo and was remaining silent.

During his stay in London, Mr. Sivanayagam launched and edited the monthly journal 'Hot Spring' and also mentored Diaspora Tamil writers and journalists.

The 684-page monograph he brought out, “Sri Lanka: A Witness to History” is also a monograph on the history of the liberation struggle of Eezham Tamils from the point of view of a journalist.

Born in Va’n’naarpa’n’nai in Jaffna on 7th September 1930, Mr. Sivanayagam had his schooling at Kokkuvil Hindu College and at Jaffna College.

Since 1953, he was in the editorial staff of various newspapers coming from Colombo: The Daily News, The Times of Ceylon and The Daily Mirror. In the 70s, he was editor to the publications of the Ceylon Tourist Board.

© Tamil Net

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One country, two nations

Image courtesy: The Economist

Banyan | The Economist
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They look more like desperate refugees than the pampered vanguard of an organised mass colonisation. But that is how most local Tamils view the 600-odd ethnic Sinhalese who pitched up at the derelict railway station in the northern Sri Lankan town of Jaffna last month. As the new arrivals saw it, they were moving back home after a stay in the south. Now resettled in the crudest of tarpaulin shelters at Navatkuli, just outside town, crowded onto scrubby land shaded by a few coconut palms, they complain of joblessness and worry about the approaching rainy season. But they insist they are here to stay.

The locals’ suspicions suggest the government’s triumph last year over Velupillai Prabhakaran and his Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, ending their 26-year fight for a Tamil “homeland”, is in one sense incomplete. Most Tamils, many of whom loathed and feared the brutal Tigers, feel it as a defeat. National reconciliation still seems more a rhetorical ideal than a government policy.

In the south, among the largely Buddhist Sinhalese majority, Mahinda Rajapaksa, inaugurated for his second presidential term on November 19th, is monarch of all he surveys (and he does little to discourage intimations of royalty). Wildly popular for ending the war, he has sanctioned an epic personality cult. With three brothers, a son and a nephew in leading political roles, his family controls almost all levers of power. His only rival in popular esteem—Sarath Fonseka, his former army chief and then a challenger for the presidency in January—is in jail. Journalists admit to censoring themselves out of fear. A state of emergency is still in force, though Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the brother who runs the defence ministry, says it will be lifted in two or three months. The government has amended the constitution to get rid of term-limits and other tiresome checks on presidential power.

In Tamil-dominated Jaffna, however, presidential portraits, plastered all over the south for the inauguration, are scarce. Local politicians see their people as marginalised. They discount the president’s vague promises of a serious devolution of power. They note how he qualified that pledge in a recent interview: the Tamil parties must “realise that what we refused to give Prabhakaran, we won’t give to others.”

Tamil politicians believe the government intends to curb Tamil nationalism through intense security and population transfer. Hence their reaction to the arrival of 183 families from the south. These Sinhalese say they fled ethnic violence in Jaffna at the start of the war in 1983, and were dispersed in various southern districts. They were never fully accepted there, they say, being seen as quasi-Tamils. But they kept in touch with each other all these years. At least half had been born since 1983, and had never set foot in the north. But when they heard that Jaffna was now peaceful, they arranged a fleet of buses and came back together.

It is hard to believe that they did so entirely spontaneously. But to extrapolate from there to a full-scale colonisation plan, as so many Tamils do, reveals an enormous distrust of the government. So does speculation that the army intends to establish permanent cantonments throughout the north, moving military families to the area to join the soldiers. Despite the outbreak of peace, this week’s government budget awarded the biggest outlay to defence. Gotabaya Rajapaksa argues that, having tripled the size of the armed forces to win the war, he cannot “send those people home”, where they would have nothing to do.

The mutual distrust is an inevitable legacy of the civil war and the slaughter in which it ended last year. It is made worse by official secrecy. The government rejected an international inquiry into alleged war crimes by both sides. The “Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission” it appointed instead has heard some valuable testimony. But, boycotted by leading international and domestic NGOs, it lacks credibility. The camps where 330,000 displaced people were interned after the war were closed to most outside scrutiny. This week the International Committee of the Red Cross announced that it had been told to close its offices in Jaffna and Vavuniya, near the biggest camps. It is still rare for foreign journalists to be allowed to visit the north.

Even government critics, however, concede that peace is better than war. And some of the worst of the scare stories about the government’s intentions have proved unfounded. It was accused of planning to intern Tamils in the camps indefinitely. But over 300,000 have already left. Many have yet to rebuild their lives. Ashok, a 38-year-old Hindu priest (most Tamils are Hindus and resent the Buddhist pagodas sprouting in the north for the army’s use), is used to being shunted around. He was first displaced in 1990, from Palali, near Jaffna, one of the much-resented “high-security zones”, from which civilians were evacuated.

After such knowledge, what forgiveness?

Ashok then lived in Tiger-controlled Jaffna until 1995, when he retreated with them to a stronghold elsewhere in the north. In 2009 he had to abandon another home in the flight to the Tigers’ final redoubt. He was one of the tens of thousands to escape from there in the war’s last days, and then spent seven months in a camp. Being a priest spared him from suspicions of being a full-fledged Tiger. Back in Jaffna, he hopes to go back to Palali one day.

Such life stories help explain why reconciliation is difficult. The failure even to attempt it, however, is “inviting another terrorist movement”, in the words of a politician representing Sri Lanka’s Muslims, another aggrieved minority. So thorough was the army’s victory that the risks of that seem tiny for now. And both India, in Kashmir, and China, in Tibet, have shown in their different ways that it is possible to keep a resentful local population in check for decades. But Sri Lanka’s optimists hoped the end of the war might herald a future so much brighter than that.

© The Economist

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Sri Lanka: ‘Cormorant Strike’ in full swing

By Dharma Sri Abeyratne | Daily News
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A joint Army, Navy and Air Force exercise code-named ‘Cormorant Strike’ is being carried out in Silawatura, Mannar at present. Around 2,500 Security Forces personnel are taking part in the exercise.

In addition 40 naval and aircraft including the Shakthi naval vessel, Kfir aircraft, MI 24 helicopters, Y12 and MI 17 participated in the Cormorant Strike. Security forces personnel from the commando regiment and Special Forces directly are involved in ground battle. They were brought to the land from the Shakthi ship by Navy vessels. This amphibious landing was jointly coordinated by senior security officials in the Tri-Forces. Besides commando troops landed with the support of helicopters. “This exercise commenced a few days ago. During that period troops have already been deployed for the preliminary operations and main operation. These troops will gain all the territories that have been designed as an enemy area,” Military spokesman Major General Ubaya Medawala said. Through this exercise different levels of command will be exercised in command ability, decision making ability, and how they evolve different plans to match the concept already evaluated and need to put into practice.

Through this exercise the gained pluses as well as shortcomings will be taken into consideration, he added.

This is the first time in the history of Sri Lankan Security Forces that such a joint exercise is held. Military exercises are to be conducted regularly to gauge and assess military effectiveness of any army or armed forces, Major General Ubaya Medawala said.

The Military Spokesman said so addressing media yesterday in Silawatura, Mannar.

© Daily News

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Sri Lanka Army holds leader of protestors under house arrest

Tamil Net
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More than ten Sri Lanka Army (SLA) soldiers arriving Thursday around 11:00 a.m at the house of the President of Oottuppulam Rural Development Society (RDS), who led the protest demonstration Wednesday demanding the cancellation of the sudden transfer of Karaichchi Divisional Secretary on the instructions of SLA authorities, continue to hold him under house arrest surrounding his house, sources in Ki’linochchi said. The president who is held under house arrest was to lead a hunger strike in front of Ki’linochchi Government Agent’s office Thursday along with nine other RDS presidents and a large number of civilians until the transfer order issued to the Divisional Secretary was cancelled.

Meanwhile, SLA officials in Ira’naimadu base had summoned Thursday morning the Presidents of nine RDSs in Karaichchi Division who were to join in the hunger strike and threatened them not to participate in any kind of demonstration warning that the failure to comply would lead to drastic consequences to them, the sources said.

The RDS President held under house arrest by SLA is Cinnaiah, 68.

Two men suspected to be SLA soldiers forcibly entering Cinnaiah’s house Wednesday night had attacked the occupants, the sources further said.

Ms. Sivakumar had instructed SLA to vacate the lands of the local people which the SLA authorities had claimed as government property. The said lands had been issued to their owners by the government in 1994 and the owners have the documents to establish their ownership.

The SLA officials angered by the action of the Divisional Secretary had had her transferred out within two hours after she instructed the SLA to vacate the said lands.

Welfare associations and public organizations in Karaichchi in Ki’linochchi district had gathered in protest Wednesday morning in front of Ki’linochchi Government Agent’s office demanding immediate cancellation of the sudden transfer of Karaichchi Divisional Secretary, Ms. Sivakumar, issued on the instructions of local SLA officials.

© Tamil Net

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Sri Lanka court denies bail to student union leader

Colombo Page
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A Sri Lankan court today ordered to further remand a student union leader who was arrested by the police last month for forcibly entering the Higher Education Ministry premises and damaging government property.

The Colombo High Court Judge Deepali Wijesundara today ordered to remand the Convener of the Inter University Students Federation (IUSF) Udul Premaratne till December 10th when the bail application was heard.

Cinnamon Gardens Police has submitted a report to the Court saying that two more suspects over the incident are yet to be arrested and requested the Court to hold Premaratne in remand custody until those suspects are nabbed.

Premaratne was arrested last month for allegedly breaking into the Higher Education Ministry premises and causing damage to public property during a protest.

© Colombo Page

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Nepal refutes Sri Lankan president's mediator claims

Utpal Parashar | Hindustan Times
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Nepal has refuted claims made by a Sri Lankan minister that it had sought the island nation's help to diffuse the ongoing political crisis in the Himalyan nation. Sri Lankan external affairs minister GL Peiris had stated in parliament on Wednesday that Nepal President Ram Baran Yadav had sought his Sri Lankan counterpart Mahinda Rajapaksa's help.

He said that the request was made when both the presidents had met last month in China on sidelines of the Shanghai Expo.

"It is a baseless claim. No such request was made by the President during his meeting with the Sri Lankan President," Rajendra Dahal, press advisor to President Ram Baran Yadav told HT.

He added that the Nepali embassy in Sri Lanka has also issued a statement terming the claim as unsubstantiated.

The fresh development comes amid growing resentment in Nepal against India's alleged interference in the deadlocked prime ministerial poll.

Despite 16 rounds of voting since Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal's resignation in June, Nepal has failed to find a replacement.

Difference among parties over who should head the next government is the main reason for the impasse.

Maoist party chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal who withdrew from the contest after seven failed attempts has accused India of sabotaging his chances at regaining the post he quit in May last year.

The delay in electing a new prime minister has also affected the peace process and drafting of the country's new constitution.

Integration of former Maoist combatants into Nepal's army is another area of dispute that has brought the four year old peace process to a near halt.

In July this year Rajapaksa has visited Male to mediate in the crisis between the Maldives President and the opposition controlled parliament.

"President Rajapaksa is now being accepted not only as the leader of Sri Lanka but as a regional leader too," Peiris was quoted by Sri Lankan media.

The minister's statement was widely reported in the island's media as reflection of Rajapaksa’s growing stature both within Sri Lanka and outside.

© Hindustan Times

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Indian FM in Sri Lanka amid growing Chinese influence

Agence France Presse
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Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna was due in Sri Lanka Thursday to shore up bilateral relations amid growing Chinese influence on the island.

Krishna is due to call on President Mahinda Rajapakse and also open two Indian consulates in the southern and northernmost parts of the island before leaving on Sunday, the Sri Lankan foreign ministry said.

The Indian minister will travel to the southern town of Hambantota on Friday to open an Indian Consulate General office, eight days after the government launched the first stage of a 1.5-billion-dollar Chinese-funded port there.

New Delhi is believed to be concerned that Hambantota is part of a Chinese policy to throw a "string of pearls" geographical circle of influence around India.

China is also developing port facilities in Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan, and has plans for rail projects in Nepal and Sri Lanka.

A diplomatic source said India was keen to speed up some of its own port, power and railway projects in the island which is emerging after 37 years of ethnic conflict following the defeat of Tamil Tiger rebels in May last year.

Krishna is also expected to travel to the island's northern tip of Jaffna to open another consulate in an area where Tamil Tiger rebels once ran a de facto state between 1990 and 1995.

The minister will hold bilateral meetings with, among others, his counterpart G. L. Peiris as part of India-Sri Lanka Joint Commission, the Sri Lankan foreign ministry said in a statement.

"This will provide the two countries an opportunity to review the growing ties between Sri Lanka and India; monitor implementation of bilateral understandings and further enhance the bilateral relations," the ministry said.

It said the two sides will follow up on the understandings reached during Rajapakse's visit to New Delhi in June when Indian nudged the island to move towards national reconciliation after crushing Tamil rebels last year.

India, which has some 62 million Tamils in its southern Tamil Nadu state, wields considerable diplomatic influence over Colombo and has been urging the Sinhalese-majority government to share power with minority Tamils.

© AFP

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Sri Lankan police send 'mass grave' ashes for forensic testing

ANI | Sify News
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Sri Lankan police have reportedly sent 24 bags full of ashes for forensic testing from a suspected mass grave of government troops in the north-eastern parts bordering Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts.

The BBC quoted officials as saying that jailed Tamil Tiger rebels had admitted that the grave contained the remains of 26 troops, including eight soldiers and 18 navy personnel, they had captured and shot dead in January 2009.

According to police, a small amount of human bones had been found at the site.

Police spokesman Prishantha Jayakody said that in addition a "powdery substance," suspected to be human ashes, was also found and sent for forensic testing.

A team of legal and medical officers and a government analyst have been sent to the site, the report said.

Sri Lanka's long civil war ended in May 2009 with the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Both the government troops and the LTTE were accused of violating human rights during the final days and international human rights groups claim that over 30,000 civilians were killed during the final battles last year, it added.

Human rights groups have also accused the two sides of violating human rights, especially in the final months of the war.

© Sify.com

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